This paper explores the empirical relationship among insider trading law, other legal rules and institutions, and equity markets in an international context. In particular, using legal and economic data from a cross-section of countries, I investigate two empirical relationships: the relationship between insider trading law and ownership concentration and the relationship between insider trading law and equity market liquidity. Consistent with agency theories which predict that the ability of insiders to engage in uninhibited trading encourages concentrated share ownership, I find that tougher insider trading laws are negatively and significantly related to the degree of ownership concentration in publicly traded companies. That is, in economic regimes where insider trading is more stringently regulated, large shareholders hold a significantly lower fraction of outstanding shares. In addition, consistent with market microstructure theories of the relationship between asymmetric information and trading costs, I find that weaker insider trading regimes have, on average, less liquid equity markets. It is hoped that the findings of this paper will inform the ongoing law and economics debate over the desirability of regulating trading by corporate insiders.
I. Introduction
Insider trading has been discussed extensively in the law and economics literature. The essence of the debate is whether insider trading is inefficient and thus harmful to equity markets and ought to be subject to government regulation. Some commentators argue that insider trading is indeed harmful and therefore that (some forms of it) ought to be prohibited through regulation. Others, however, argue that insider trading is not inefficient but rather, on the contrary, is efficient and therefore prohibiting it does not make sense.
Theories on insider trading fall into two main categories: agency theories and market theories of insider trading. Agency theories of insider trading analyze the effect of insider trading on the classic agency problem (i.e., manager-shareholder or insideroutsider conflict of interest).
1 In this context, insider trading is evaluated according to whether it ameliorates or worsens agency costs. The analysis is largely confined to the Yet, the quality of these markets in different economies is widely divergent.
5
Therefore, mainstream theories of insider trading are vulnerable to the oftenheard Anglo-American bias critique. Approaches to insider trading that are appropriate in the U.S. context might very well be inappropriate abroad, particularly for emerging capital markets that lack the strong markets and legal institutions of the United States.
For example, assuming one could carry out such an exercise, if one found that tougher laws on insider trading in the United States do not improve market and firm efficiency, this would not necessarily imply that insider trading law should not be implemented in an emerging market. 6 Other aspects of the economic and regulatory environment must first be taken into account.
Therefore, in the spirit of the growing literature 7 on comparative corporate governance and securities regulation, this paper explores the empirical relationship among insider trading law, other legal rules and institutions, and equity markets in an international context. In particular, using legal and economic data from a cross-section of countries, I investigate two empirical relationships: the relationship between insider trading law and ownership concentration and the relationship between insider trading law and equity market liquidity. I find that insider trading law is significantly negatively 857, 866 (1983 related to ownership concentration, consistent with agency theories (both for and against insider trading) which predict that the ability to engage in uninhibited insider trading encourages concentrated share ownership. However, consistent with market microstructure theories of the relationship between asymmetric information and trading costs, I find that weaker insider trading regimes have, on average, less liquid equity markets.
The paper is organized as follows. Part II reviews the law and economics literature on insider trading. Arguments both against and for the prohibition of insider trading are presented. I divide these arguments into two categories: arguments based on agency theory and arguments based on overall market efficiency. In Part III, I present several testable hypotheses concerning the relationship between the stringency of the insider trading legal regime and financial market outcomes, based on existing theoretical literature. Part IV presents the data. In that section, I describe the variables used in the empirical analysis and, in particular, explain how I constructed a variable measuring the stringency of insider trading law. Part IV also addresses the contextual (legal and economic) background of insider trading law across countries, by examining correlations between various legal and economic variables. Part V presents the results from multivariate regression analysis. Part VI discusses limitations of the study and charts the direction of future work. Finally, Part VII concludes the paper.
II. Law and Economics Theories of Insider Trading

A. Agency Theories of Insider Trading
Agency theories of insider trading analyze the effects of insider trading on firm efficiency. Proponents of unregulated insider trading argue that insider trading is efficient because it reduces the manager-shareholder conflict of interest. In contrast, opponents of uninhibited insider trading maintain that insider trading is inefficient because it increases the divergence of interests between shareholders and managers (or, more generally, between insiders and outsiders). Essentially, the disagreement is over whether insider trading is beneficial to outside shareholders, or instead, represents an inefficient private benefit of control that accrues to insiders at outsiders' expense.
Insider Trading as an Efficient Compensation Device
Henry Manne was one of the earliest legal scholars to bring economic analysis to bear on the debate over insider trading. 8 Contrary to the mainstream legal consensus of the time, Manne argued that trading by insiders on material nonpublic information is economically efficient. 9 His argument is basically that insider trading is an efficient form of managerial compensation because it reduces the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders.
HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
9 Id. at 101, 102.
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The separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation gives rise to agency costs, which reduce the value of the firm. 10 Shareholders can only imperfectly monitor managers. As a result, managers have an incentive and are able to act in ways that serve their interests, but not necessarily the firm's. Such activities might include, for example, taking excessive perquisites or pursuing sub-optimal investment projects.
These activities reduce firm value at the expense of shareholders who cannot perfectly monitor.
However, depending on the background environment, markets might constrain the conflict between managers and shareholders. For example, competitive capital and labor markets might limit managers' capacity to engage in value-reducing opportunistic behavior. 11 Nevertheless, these markets work imperfectly. The market for corporate control, for example, may be stifled by weak anti-director legal rules, making it relatively difficult to remove poorly performing managers. 12 In turn, this results in lower managerial compensation, since shareholders discount share prices accordingly.
As a result, "both managers and shareholders will have incentives to reach agreements ex ante that limit divergent behavior by managers."
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One common way in which managers and shareholders address this problem is by writing contracts that give managers incentives to behave efficiently. The problem with these contracts, however, is that many of them require "periodic renegotiations ex Basing compensation in part on insider trading is one method for sorting superior from inferior managers. Because insider trading rewards those managers who create valuable information and are willing to take risks, managers who most prefer such compensation schemes may be those who are the least risk averse and the most capable.
17
Because the ability to engage in insider trading induces the most able managers to selfselect into firms that allow it, the argument goes, insider trading reduces both screening and monitoring costs.
Proponents of insider trading as an efficient compensation device also have a response to the criticism that it gives managers a put option on the firm and therefore increases their incentives to reduce firm value. Short-selling is not a problem, in their ECON. 1155 ECON. (1985 . 17 Carlton and Fischel, supra note 3, at 871-872.
view, because it enhances managers' risk-taking in favor of high expected return projects:
By permitting managers to sell short and thereby profit from investment projects that are optimal ex ante, even if they do not turn out well ex post, insider trading may induce managers to take on projects with a high expected return even if they are riskier. The ability to profit by selling, therefore, as well as the ability to profit by buying, may reduce divergence of interests between managers and shareholders by causing managers to behave in a less risk-averse.
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Law and economics supporters of the view that insider trading reduces agency costs argue that the evidence supports their theory. If insider trading is bad, they ask, why do we not observe firms making significant attempts to ban it? According to the FINANCIAL REGULATION 177, 184, 193 (F. Edwards, ed. 1979 Another market efficiency argument against unregulated insider trading is that it might distort mangers' incentives to engage in timely disclosure of information. That is, rather than functioning as an alternative, less costly and more rapid means of corporate disclosure, insider trading might actually lead to less efficient disclosure. Insider trading might delay the disclosure of information since insiders will prefer to trade incrementally in order "to preserve their informational monopolies."
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[B]ecause trading profits depend on control over information, there is no guarantee that the originators of successful projects will reap the rewards. Indeed, insider trading might be expected to induce a variety of perverse behaviors by managers who would compete to acquire and hoard information within the firm.
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If background 'noise' is sufficient, insider trading might even fail completely to move prices.
43
Finally, a growing body of economic literature on market microstructure suggests that insider trading on nonpublic information might reduce market liquidity.
This work builds on the original insight of Akerlof, who shows that markets malfunction when there is asymmetric information and, in extreme cases of information asymmetry, may break down entirely. 44 The microstructure literature has applied this logic to equity markets, showing that in these markets information asymmetry can compromise liquidity. 45 In particular, this literature has shown that asymmetric information increases the cost of trading. In turn, higher trading costs imply lower liquidity. However, they subsidize their losses vis-a-vis informed traders by charging liquidity traders an immediacy fee. 47 This fee is the bid-ask spread. The greater the degree of asymmetric information, the greater the bid-ask spread (i.e., cost of trading). 48 This logic suggests that, because insider trading is a type of informed trading, the greater its incidence, the higher are the costs of trading for uninformed investors and hence the lower is market liquidity.
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III. Testable Hypotheses
In this section, I formulate a number of empirically testable hypotheses motivated both by existing theoretical literature and by data availability.
Insider Trading Regime and Ownership Concentration
Although the law and economics literature covering agency theories of insider trading does not directly lend itself to empirical testing, related literature suggests some In such countries, the private benefits coming with a lock on control are large enough for controllers to be reluctant to forego their lock on control. Even if they need to raise much more capital, they will do so by using pyramids, cross-holdings, and dual-class -even when such schemes will be costly in terms of extra payments and agency costs.
55
If the relative ease with which corporate insiders are able to trade on material, nonpublic information is regarded as a private benefit of control, the implication of Bebchuk's analysis is that, other things equal, controlling shareholders should be less willing to give up control to outsiders under more lax insider trading regimes. Conversely, countries with more lax insider trading regimes have more concentrated corporate ownership structures.
Insider Trading Regime and Equity Market Liquidity
As discussed in Part I above, the superior information of insiders generates informational asymmetry in the secondary trading markets. In turn, asymmetric information increases the costs of trading as market makers raise bid-ask spreads to take into account the probability that they are trading against more informed corporate insiders.
Therefore, the following testable hypothesis naturally emerges. Tougher insider trading laws are associated with greater stock market liquidity, other things equal.
Thus, countries with tougher sanctions against insider trading have more liquid equity markets.
Insider Trading Law and Disclosure
As argued in Part I, it is important to consider the contemporaneous legal and institutional environment in which a law operates. investors are not harmed when they trade on anonymous public markets). 73 Of course, there is potential for abuse and inefficient use of private rights of action, but this does not change the analysis. It merely goes to the issue of the optimal level of regulation, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 74 Unfortunately, I
do not yet have information on the level of enforcement, though there is reason to believe that enforcement might be more important than the laws on the books. Table 2 highlights two of the more striking patterns among the countries. In particular, it focuses on the criteria along which countries and legal families exhibit the greatest diversity, namely the existence of a private right of action and multiple damages. Table 2 shows that in 64% of the sample of common law countries, the law A similar comparative pattern applies to the availability of multiple damages (for the state or private parties) against inside traders. Table 2 shows that common law countries are more likely to subject inside traders to damage penalties at a multiple of their trading profits.
Summary Statistics of Economic Variables
Following La Porta et al., Table 3 Table 3 differ somewhat from theirs due to the fact that I am using a slightly smaller sample of countries, i.e., those for whom insider trading legislation was available. However, the results are largely qualitatively similar to theirs. 77 For example, La Porta et al. find that common law countries have more listed firms and more initial public offerings per one million people than civil law countries, especially French civil law countries. They also find that common law countries have relatively larger public debt markets. La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 12. These results are replicated in Table 3 , columns 2 and 3, respectively (see Appendix). 78 For instance, common law countries "most frequently (39%) allow shareholders to vote by mail, they never block shares for shareholder meetings, they have the highest (94%) incidence of laws protecting oppressed minorities, and they generally require relatively little share capital (9%) to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting." Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 ECON. , 1129 ECON. (1998 Table 3 shows that French civil law countries have the greatest degree of ownership concentration in their largest firms, followed by common law countries. Scandinavian and German civil law countries have the lowest concentration of ownership among their largest firms.
Furthermore, the difference between civil law countries and common law countries is not statistically significant (Panel B, Table 3 , column 5). However, there is significant heterogeneity among civil law countries.
The market turnover ratio (a measure of equity market liquidity) is greatest in
German civil law countries and lowest in French civil law and English common law countries (column 6). Scandinavian civil law countries have an intermediate average turnover ratio. Though German civil law countries, as a group, have a significantly higher average turnover ratio than all of the other groups individually, the difference between civil and common law countries as a whole is not highly significant (Panel B, Table 3 , column 6).
As a measure the quality of disclosure, I utilize an index of the quality of countries' accounting standards (column 8). 81 As shown in law countries, German civil law countries, and French civil law countries. Thus, the French civil law family finishes last on yet another dimension of investor protection.
Finally, the difference between common law and civil law countries is statistically significant, due largely to the influence of the French civil law countries (Panel B, Table   3 , column 8).
It is interesting to note briefly that Scandinavian civil law countries have both the best accounting standards and the lowest assessment by market participants of insider trading as a problem in their equity markets (column 9). 82 Arguably, this perception is influenced by the relatively greater transparency of Scandinavian markets, as reflected in their superior accounting standards. In fact, for the entire sample, better accounting standards are positively and significantly correlated with market participants' assessment of insider trading. The correlation coefficient between these two variables is .49 and is significant at the 1% level. In contrast, the correlation between insider trading law and the public's perception of insider trading is .38, with a significance level of 5%. This might suggest that superior disclosure standards give the investing public a greater sense of protection from insider trading than laws aimed directly at insider trading. Table 4 suggests that legal systems that give investors relatively greater antidirector rights also tend to have stronger insider trading laws (the correlation coefficient is .34 and is significant at the 5% level). On the other hand, there is no significant correlation between minority voting rights and insider trading law. Nor is the correlation between insider trading law and accounting standards significant.
Insider Trading Law in Context
As expected, ownership concentration is significantly negatively correlated with both the subjective measure of the severity of insider trading and the toughness of insider trading law. Also as expected, the correlation between insider trading law and market turnover is positive and significant. Furthermore, market capitalization held by outside shareholders relative to GNP is positively correlated with both the objective index of insider trading law and the public's subjective assessment of insider trading.
However, the correlation is significant only for the subjective measure of insider trading, but not for the objective measure of insider trading law.
V. Cross-Sectional Multivariate Regression Results
Ownership Concentration
Recalling the discussion in Part II above, tougher insider trading laws should be associated with less concentrated share ownership. For the same reasons, one would expect a worse public perception of insider trading to be associated with higher ownership concentration, to the extent that it discourages outside investors from holding shares. Accordingly, Table 5 presents the results of several regressions of the first measure of ownership concentration -the fraction of shares held by the three largest shareholders in the ten largest firms in the economy -on the two insider trading variables. Standard errors in parentheses.
a. Significant at the 1% level. b. Significant at the 5% level. c. Significant at the 10% level. d. Significant at the 20% level.
The basic regression (not shown) of ownership concentration on log GNP and legal origin dummies yields results which are similar to those of La Porta et al. 83 In particular, it has an adjusted R-squared of 40 percent which, though 9 percentage points less than theirs, 84 is still quite high for a cross-country regression. Consistent with their results, the basic regression suggests that ownership concentration is lower in larger economies. Also, French civil law countries have a significantly higher concentration of ownership.
The first regression shown in Table 5 includes some of the investor protection variables considered by La Porta et al., 85 as well as the public perception measure of insider trading. Adjusted R-squared increases to 46 percent. As in La Porta et al., the coefficient on French legal origin becomes negative but insignificant. 86 The first regression in Table 5 also suggests that countries with superior rule of law and accounting standards have a statistically significantly smaller ownership concentration.
In addition, countries with superior aggregate anti-director rights also have a statistically significantly lower concentration of ownership. The coefficient on one-share-one-vote is insignificant, however. Counterintuitively, the coefficient on the public perception insider trading measure is positive. However, it is insignificant.
The second regression of coefficient on the insider trading index is negative and significant at the 10 percent level Finally, the third regression in Table 5 replaces the insider trading measures with the private right of action dummy, in order to determine whether such a right is important by itself. Though the coefficient is negative, as expected, it is insignificant.
In sum, Table 5 However, it is also consistent with agency cost arguments against unrestricted insider trading. Both these strands of argument predict that tougher insider trading laws, to the extent that they reduce the potential profitability of insider trading, should lessen the incentive for concentrated shareholding. The results in Table 5 suggest that this is indeed the case. The first regression in Table 6 includes two economic control variables (GDP growth and log GNP) rule of law, and the subjective insider trading variable. The coefficient on GDP growth is positive and significant, while the coefficient on log GNP is insignificant. Rule of law has a negative but insignificant coefficient. Contrary to expectations, the coefficient on the subjective measure of insider trading is highly negative and significant (at the 1% level), suggesting that markets with a worse reputation for insider trading have greater ownership dispersion. However, this effect disappears in the second regression.
The second regression controls for legal origin dummies. Civil law countries all have negative and significant coefficients, consistent with La Porta et al. 90 The coefficient on the subjective insider trading measure becomes positive (as expected) but insignificant. This result suggests that legal origin encompasses whatever is driving the public's perception of the insider trading problem. In other words, the public's perception of insider trading does not have an independent influence on ownership dispersion relative to the size of the economy. In contrast, La Porta et al. find that aggregate anti-director rights and voting rights are still significant after controlling for legal origin, possibly suggesting that broad anti-director protections and voting rights are a more important consideration for minority shareholders than their perceived likelihood of expropriation via illicit trading by corporate insiders.
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The third regression in Table 6 includes the objective measure of insider trading law, but omits the legal origin dummies. As expected, the coefficient on the index of insider trading law is positive. That is, tougher laws are associated with greater ownership dispersion relative to the size of the economy. However, the coefficient is insignificant. Furthermore, adding the legal origin dummies in the last column of Table   6 causes the coefficient on the insider trading law variable to become negative, though it 90 See Id.
remains insignificant.
In sum, therefore, tables 5 and 6 yield seemingly contradictory results. The results in Table 5 suggest that insider trading law is significantly negatively related to the average ownership concentration among the few (3) largest shareholders of the (10) largest private firms in the economy (column 2 of Table 5 ). On the other hand, the results in Table 6 imply that insider trading law (as well as the degree to which the public perceives insider trading to be a problem) has an insignificant bearing on outside ownership of market capitalization relative to the economy's size. Once legal origin is taken into consideration, the significance (if any) of insider trading disappears (see columns 2 and 4 of Table 6 ).
However, the results in Table 6 ought to be regarded with some caution due to the manner in which La Porta et al. have constructed the external ownership variable used here. In particular, they define outside ownership "as the product of the aggregate stock market capitalization and the average percentage of common shares not owned by the top three shareholders in the ten largest non-financial, privately-owned domestic firms." 92 The underlying assumption is that all "shares not owned by the top three shareholders" represent widely held shares. If this assumption is wrong, then La Porta et al.'s external ownership variable provides a misleading measure of actual ownership dispersion. In contrast, the ownership variable in Table 5 is an actual figure.
Overall, therefore, the results suggest that tougher insider trading laws coincide with lower ownership concentration. fraction of total capitalization in economies where insider trading laws are more stringent.
Stock Market Liquidity
In Part III, I hypothesized that tougher sanctions against insider trading violations should be associated with more liquid equity markets, other things equal.
Furthermore, to the extent that insider trading laws and corporate disclosure are complementary means to discourage trading by insiders, countries with more strict disclosure requirements (imperfectly measured here by the quality of accounting standards) should have less of an insider trading problem and more liquid markets for any given level of insider trading law. 93 As a measure of market liquidity in the regressions that follow, I use the turnover ratio, which is the total value traded relative to average market capitalization. Table 7 presents the results of various regression specifications.
93 See generally Shin, supra note 58 (relating insider trading and disclosure law); Baimain and Verrecchia, supra note 59 (discussing inverse relationship between disclosure and insider trading). I first ran a basic regression specification (not shown) in which turnover was regressed on log GNP, GDP growth, and each of the insider trading measures and accounting standards separately. In the basic regression, neither of the two insider trading measures nor the accounting standards variable is significant. All of the specifications show that larger economies have greater turnover. However, turnover is not influenced by the growth rate of GDP. Membership in the German civil law family has a positive and significant effect on market turnover. Columns 3 through 5 demonstrate that when the legal origin dummies are included along with the insider trading and accounting variables, insider trading law becomes significant.
The first two columns of Table 7 suggest that the public's perception of insider trading does not affect market turnover, while the third through fifth columns suggest, in contrast, that tougher laws do matter. The second column includes both the subjective measure of insider trading and accounting standards. The coefficient on accounting standards is positive and significant in this regression. However, when accounting standards and the index of insider trading legislation are combined in the same regression (columns 3 through 5), accounting standards become unimportant.
Controlling for insider trading law eliminates the influence of accounting standards. It therefore appears that better accounting standards do not have an independent influence on equity market turnover, once insider trading law is controlled for.
In sum, Table 7 suggests that tougher insider trading laws have a positive impact on market liquidity, as hypothesized. However, the relationship is not significant beyond a 10% level. On the other hand, even this level of significance seems large, in light of the small sample size and the high degree of noise inherent in cross-country regressions. In contrast, the public's perception of the prevalence of insider trading is insignificant in all of the turnover regressions. This is somewhat puzzling, since insider trading law should increase market liquidity to the extent that it reduces market participants' perception that they are trading against better informed insiders. A possible explanation of this puzzle is that other, unmeasured factors (like enforcement/probability of detection) have a greater influence on public investors' perception of trading by corporate insiders than do the laws on the books. That is, the written laws may not be the most crucial consideration in investors' assessment of the insider trading climate.
Another potential explanation of the apparent insignificance of the public's assessment of the severity of insider trading is that the people surveyed may have been sophisticated market participants (including, perhaps, corporate insiders). In that case, arguably they had an incentive to understate insider trading. The effect of such understatement would be to make the public perception variable uninformative. A final explanation might be that, in fact, insider trading is wholly irrelevant to market liquidity. But this is inconsistent with the finding of a statistically significant positive relationship between tougher insider trading laws and market turnover. 94 It is also inconsistent with the market microstructure literature (theoretical and empirical) which suggests that greater information asymmetry increases trading costs (and therefore market liquidity).
Summary of Results
This research has yielded the following results. First, tougher insider trading laws are negatively and significantly associated with ownership concentration among 94 However, the positive coefficient might be due to endogeneity between market liquidity and insider trading law. See generally, Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, supra note 49 (arguing this very point). Unfortunately, the data do not allow me to substantiate this claim.
large shareholders. This result holds even after controlling for legal origin and two important investor protection measures, anti-director rights and voting rights. The fact that tougher insider trading laws coincide with lower ownership concentration among the largest shareholders is consistent with the argument that tougher securities laws discourage large shareholders. 95 It is also consistent with agency cost arguments against allowing unrestricted trading by corporate insiders. However, I find no relationship between insider trading and outside ownership relative to the size of the economy.
Second, I find that tougher insider trading laws are positively associated with the market turnover ratio (one measure of market liquidity). This finding is consistent with theoretical and empirical research in market microstructure. It also lends support to law and economics arguments against unrestrained insider trading on market efficiency grounds.
Finally, I find that greater transparency as approximated by the quality of accounting standards is (weakly) positively associated with lower ownership concentration among the largest shareholders. This result holds even after controlling for insider trading legislation. Such a finding is consistent with the argument that more stringent disclosure laws reduce the costs of breaking up concentrated stockholdings and diversifying portfolios. 96 It is also consistent with the hypothesis that insider trading legislation and disclosure rules have complementary effects on equity markets. 97 On the other hand, better accounting standards affect neither the degree of ownership dispersion relative to market size nor market turnover. 
VI. Limitations and Direction of Future Work
A major contribution of this paper is the insider trading law variable. Hopefully, other researchers will find it useful in analyzing related questions in law and finance.
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This variable, however, is not without shortcomings. Aside from the general difficulty inherent in quantifying legal variables, I have some concern about whether it accurately ranks countries according to how stringent their insider trading laws are. I tried to choose the criteria that I thought would make a law tougher, but it is impossible to capture everything in discrete variables. In addition, the laws on the books do not tell a Two other shortcomings of the data concern the variables on liquidity (stock market turnover ratio) and accounting standards. Aggregate equity market turnover is a very rough proxy for trading costs, which are probably considerably more directly influenced by the presence of asymmetric information than is aggregate turnover.
Fortunately, I have just received data on transactions costs in different countries, 98 In fact, I am aware of several scholars who have already made use of it.
including the countries in this study. 99 I will incorporate it into subsequent empirical work. Regarding the accounting standards variable, it is poor measure of disclosure law. Again, fortunately, I have recently received new quantitative data on stock exchanges' disclosure rules. 100 I will substitute this data for the accounting standards variable in subsequent empirical work as well.
VII. Conclusion
This research represents one of the first systematic attempts to explore the empirical link between insider trading law and various other legal and economic variables from a comparative perspective. It does not claim to be able to resolve the debate among legal scholars over the optimal level of insider trading regulation. Rather, I see it as part of the growing body of work on comparative corporate governance and securities regulation.
That said, however, some of the findings are certain to inform the ongoing law and economic debate. In particular, I find that insider trading law is associated with a lower ownership concentration at the firm level. Subject to data and methodological limitations, this finding might be illuminating to the competing agency theory claims about insider trading and its effect on corporate governance. 101 In addition, the finding that insider trading law is positively related to market liquidity might help address 99 This data is from the private firm of Elkins/McSherry Co.
competing claims about the effect of insider trading on overall market efficiency and in particular on market liquidity. 
